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Isabel Grant* and Equality and the Defence of Provocation:
Debra Parkes* Irreconcilable Differences
Recent amendments to the defence of provocation have limited access to the 
defence to those who are provoked by conduct that, if prosecuted, would have 
been an indictable offence punishable by at least five years imprisonment.  The 
paper argues that these amendments are both over- and under-inclusive and fail 
to confront the central problem surrounding provocation which is that it privileges 
loss-of-control rage often in the context of male violence against women or in 
response to same-sex advances.  The paper supports the abolition of the 
defence of provocation but only if mandatory minimum sentences for murder are 
abolished providing trial judges sufficient discretion in sentencing to consider the 
relevance of provocation.
Les récentes modifications apportées à la défense de provocation ont limité son 
accès à ceux qui sont provoqués par une conduite qui, si elle avait fait l’objet 
d’une poursuite, aurait constitué un acte criminel punissable d’au moins cinq ans 
d’emprisonnement. L’article soutient que ces modifications sont à la fois trop et pas 
assez inclusives et ne s’attaquent pas au problème central entourant la défense 
de provocation, à savoir que sont privilégiées les accès de colère et la perte de 
la maîtrise de soi, souvent dans le contexte de la violence des hommes contre les 
femmes ou en réponse à des avances faites par une personne du même sexe. 
Dans l’’article, nous préconisons l’abolition de la défense de provocation, mais 
seulement si les peines minimales obligatoires pour meurtre sont abolies, ce qui 
conférerait aux juges de première instance un pouvoir discrétionnaire suffisant 
dans la détermination de la peine pour examiner la pertinence de la provocation.
* Peter A. Allard School of Law. The authors would like to thank Rebecca Coad, Laura DeVries, 
Sarah Hannigan, Jean Murray and Kayla Strong for their research and editing assistance on this paper. 
The authors also thank Elaine Craig for reading an earlier draft of this paper and making many helpful 
suggestions.
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Introduction
The defence of provocation has long been the subject of vigorous debate 
and calls for repeal or abolition across many jurisdictions.1 Until recently, 
important developments in the law of provocation, which was added to the 
Canadian Criminal Code in 1892, have been left to the judiciary.2 In July 
2015, significant legislative amendments to the provocation defence came 
into force,3 with very little consultation or input from lawyers or scholars 
across the country. These changes were made in the name of preventing 
1. See, e.g., Kate Fitz-Gibbon, “Provocation in New South Wales: The need for abolition” (2012) 
45:2 Austl & NZ J Crim 194; Adrian Howe, “Provoking Polemic—Provoked Killings and the Ethical 
Paradoxes of the Postmodern Feminist Condition” (2002) 10:1 Fem Leg Stud 39; Andrée Côté, Diana 
Majury & Elizabeth Sheehy, Stop Excusing Violence against Women (Ottawa: National Association 
of Women and the Law, 2000); Joanne St. Lewis & Sheila Galloway, Reform of the Defence of 
Provocation (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1995). The Response of the Canadian Association 
of Elizabeth Fry Societies to Reforming Criminal Code Defences: Provocation, Self-Defence and 
Defence of Property, online: <http://www.caefs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Response-to-the-
Department-of-Justice-re-Reforming-Criminal-Code-Defences-Provocation-Self-Defence-and-
Defence-of-Property.pdf>; David Plater, Lucy Line & Kate Fitz-Gibbon, The Provoking Operation of 
Provocation: Stage 1 (Adelaide: South Australian Law Reform Institute, 2017).
2. For a more detailed history of the development of section 232, see Wayne Renke, “Calm like a 
Bomb: An Assessment of the Partial Defence of Provocation” (2010) 47:3 Alta L Rev 729 at 730-735.
3. SI/2015-0067.
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the use of the defence in honour killings.4 While reform of the defence 
of provocation was overdue, the defence remains problematic because 
Parliament chose to retain a standard based on the sudden loss of self-
control, changing only what types of insults could trigger the defence. 
Provocation is described as a recognition of “human frailties which 
sometimes lead people to act irrationally and impulsively.”5 The result 
of a successful defence is to reduce what would otherwise be murder to 
manslaughter, giving the trial judge flexibility in sentencing which is not 
available under our current sentencing regime for murder.6 The substance 
of the defence of provocation, prior to the recent amendments, was 
provided for in ss. 232(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code as follows: 
(1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced 
to manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of 
passion caused by sudden provocation.
(2) A wrongful act or insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to 
deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provocation 
for the purposes of this section if the accused acted on it on the sudden 
and before there was time for his passion to cool. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that there is both an objective 
component and a subjective component to this defence.7 The accused had 
to raise a reasonable doubt that the provocation in question was a wrongful 
act or insult sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose self-control and 
that the accused actually lost self-control and acted suddenly before his 
or her “passion” could cool. As we will discuss below, it is the objective 
component of this test that has led to the most discussion and controversy. 
Who is this ordinary person the accused is being judged against and what 
characteristics can be attributed to this fictional person? 
The defence of provocation is the only defence in the Criminal Code 
that applies only to murder. There is no defence of provocation for a 
man who, for example, loses his self-control in response to provocation, 
assaults his spouse, and seriously injures her but does not kill her. There 
is no defence where the accused tries to kill the victim and she survives 
4. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 232 (16 June 2015) at 15122 (Hon Chris 
Alexander): “We are also seeking to limit the defence of provocation, because honour, in whatever 
form, is not an excuse for violence.”
5. R v Thibert, [1996] 1 SCR 37 at para 4 [Thibert].
6. Stephen Coughlan has suggested that s 232 may best be described as a sentencing provision, in 
“Duress, Necessity, Self-Defence and Provocation: Implications of Radical Change” (2002) 7:2 Can 
Crim L Rev 147 at 176 [Coughlan, “Duress, Necessity, Self Defence”].
7. R v Tran, 2010 SCC 58, [2010] 3 SCR 350 [Tran].
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only through some fortuitous route.8 For all other crimes, we leave it to the 
sentencing judge to determine whether the provocative acts of the victim 
were in fact mitigating. The only reason to have a special defence that 
applies only where the accused’s rage is lethal is to avoid the mandatory 
minimum sentences for murder and, historically, the death penalty.9 
In 2015, Parliament amended this defence but retained its underlying 
premise of a sudden loss of self-control which is to be judged against the 
standard of the ordinary person. Subsection 232(2) now reads:
Conduct of the victim that would constitute an indictable offence under 
this Act that is punishable by five or more years of imprisonment and that 
is of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the 
power of self-control is provocation for the purposes of this section, if 
the accused acted on it on the sudden and before there was time for their 
passion to cool.10
The key change is that the triggering insult for the defence is now conduct 
of the victim that would constitute an indictable offence punishable by five 
years or more of incarceration instead of “a wrongful act or insult.”
In this paper we argue that there is no principled way to support a 
defence premised on a sudden loss of control or sudden rage, often in the 
context of male violence against women or homophobic rage. We share 
the concerns of many critics of the defence who are hesitant to recommend 
its abolition because the sentencing regime for murder is so inflexible and 
harsh. However, if the sentencing regime for murder is flawed,11 we must 
fix it, instead of perpetuating problematic defences to prop up a sentencing 
structure that is too rigid. We had hoped that the clear statement by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Tran12 about the need to limit the defence 
of provocation to conform with equality rights would be a beacon for 
future reform of the defence. However, while the recent amendments may 
rule out some problematic cases, they fail to leave us with a principled way 
of limiting the defence to cases where the loss-of-control response is truly 
deserving of mitigation. Instead the amendments draw an arbitrary bright 
line which will likely be both over-inclusive (in the sense of problematic 
8. R v Campbell (1977), 17 OR (2d) 673 (CA).
9. See, e.g., Isabel Grant, “Rethinking the Sentencing Regime for Murder” (2001) 39:2 Osgoode 
Hall LJ 655.
10. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 232(2) [emphasis added]. 
11. See Elizabeth Sheehy, “Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2001) 39:2 
Osgoode Hall LJ 529; Elizabeth A Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on Trial: Lessons from the 
Transcripts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) [Sheehy, Defending Battered Women].
12. Tran, supra note 7.
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applications of the defence continuing) and under-inclusive (in the sense 
of cases that deserve our compassion not being included) in its application. 
We begin with a brief history of the defence of provocation and an 
analysis of the problems that have arisen with its application. After a 
consideration of the meaning of substantive equality in criminal law, we 
examine the government’s response to the criticisms of provocation, and 
assesses the extent to which the new defence heeds the call of the Supreme 
Court of Canada to apply the defence in a manner that is consistent with 
equality.13 In assessing options for reform, we consider the experience of 
other jurisdictions which have amended or repealed the defence altogether. 
Finally, we conclude that the defence of provocation should be abolished 
but only if we also abandon mandatory minimum sentences for murder 
which preclude trial judges from even considering whether there are 
mitigating factors in a particular case. 
I. Problems with the defence of provocation
Our long-standing definition of provocation, referencing a “wrongful act 
or insult” demanded that courts and juries make normative assessments 
about the types of insults that warrant reducing an otherwise intentional 
killing from murder to manslaughter.14 The ordinary person standard has 
always set the normative threshold against which we assess the types of 
insults that deserve our compassion. It demands that we ask whether the 
accused’s loss of self-control comports with the standard of human frailty 
that we are willing to accept as ordinary. The defence of provocation, 
therefore, gives a somewhat contradictory message: it calls for compassion 
where the ordinary person would have lost control in response to the 
victim’s insults, even though we expect that ordinary people do not kill 
when insulted except in the most extraordinary circumstances.15 It is this 
contradiction that has led to the widespread critique of the defence16 and, 
in a number of jurisdictions, abolition or reform.17
13. Ibid; St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 1.
14. Renke argues that provocation is not about compassion but rather about calibrating the stigma for 
murder: Renke, supra note 2.
15. On this point, see Victoria Nourse, “Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation 
Defense” (1997) 106:5 Yale LJ 1331 at 1389.
16. See, e.g., Fitz-Gibbon, supra note 1; Côté, Majury & Sheehy, supra note 1; St. Lewis & 
Galloway, supra note 1; Plater, Line & Fitz-Gibbon, supra note 1.
17. For example, New Zealand and three Australian states have abolished the defence of provocation. 
See Carolyn B Ramsey, “Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law 
Reform” (2010) 100:1 J Crim L & Criminology 33; Rosemary Hunter & Danielle Tyson, “The 
Implementation of Feminist Law Reforms: The Case of Post-provocation Sentencing” (2017) 26:2 
Soc & Leg Stud 129 [Hunter & Tyson, “The Implementation of Feminist Law Reforms”].
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1. The evolution of the defence of provocation
The provocation defence developed at a time when murder was punishable 
by death and thus defences that reduced murder to manslaughter could be 
the difference between life and death. It was assumed that if killings were 
sudden, spontaneous, and in the heat of passion, they were less blameworthy 
and not deserving of the ultimate sentence of death. However, not all 
losses of self-control were equally deserving of compassion. The history 
of the defence sheds light on its gendered and homophobic underpinnings. 
Early cases centred around three types of situations considered to be 
provocative: (1) “chance medley” or a spontaneous fight between men; 
(2) a man discovering his wife in the act of adultery; and (3) a father 
discovering a man in the act of anal sex with his son.18 With respect to 
adultery, for example, a similar doctrine did not exist for a woman who 
found her husband in bed with another woman because the defence was 
related to the concept of the wife as the property of her husband, as 
reflected in the expression “Jealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is 
the highest invasion of property.”19
Gradually, courts abandoned the category-based approach to 
provocation, expanding the defence to include any killing where an 
ordinary person, faced with a similar insult, would have lost self-control, 
so long as the accused actually did lose self-control. This relaxation in 
the rigidity of the categories led to an expansion of the defence and an 
increase in the types of insults that would qualify as provocation. A 1997 
American study of provocation demonstrated that the category of adultery, 
for example, had expanded significantly to include women who were 
merely trying to leave a relationship: 
…contrary to popular understandings, men’s provocation claims are not 
based on sexual infidelity, but rather 65% of men’s claim studied by 
Nourse were made in the context of a relationship that was over, ending, 
or from which the woman was attempting to exit. Twenty-six percent 
of the provocation claims that reached the jury involved no claim of 
infidelity whatsoever, but simply departure by the woman.20
The issue that has attracted the most attention both in scholarship and case 
law is which characteristics of the accused should be incorporated into 
the ordinary person for purposes of the assessment. Historically, Canadian 
courts took a narrow approach, refusing to recognize the accused’s personal 
18. DPP v Camplin, [1978] AC 705, Lord Diplock, cited in Toni Pickard et al, Dimensions of 
Criminal Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montomery, 2002) at 811.
19. R v Mawgridge (1708), 84 ER 1107 at 1115 (QB), cited in Tran, supra note 7 at para 15.
20. Côté, Majury & Sheehy, supra note 1 at 9, citing Nourse, supra note 15 at 1345.
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characteristics and the circumstances surrounding the insult because doing 
so would undermine the normative function of the ordinary person test.21 
This meant not that the ordinary person had no characteristics but rather 
that he (and occasionally she) was implicitly ascribed the characteristics 
associated with the dominant group.22 In R. v. Hill,23 the Supreme Court 
of Canada expanded the scope of the objective test and allowed the jury 
to consider an ordinary person with the characteristics of the accused that 
“do not detract from a person’s characterization as ordinary.”24 In other 
words, it was recognized that the ordinary person has, among other things, 
a sex, an age, and a race. In R. v. Thibert, the Court went even further in 
personalizing the objective test in the context of a man who killed his 
estranged wife’s new partner. The majority noted the ordinary person, in 
this case, was a married man, faced with the breakup of his marriage.25
Many commentators thought it was a positive development to allow 
consideration of sex, age, race, and other factors into the assessment of 
what the ordinary person would do,26 in part because no one exists in the 
absence of these characteristics. Yet some thought that Thibert went too 
far in this direction27 because the more we subjectify the objective test to 
include various personal characteristics, the less it serves as a meaningful 
limit on the types of killings worthy of compassion. 
There are contexts where adding individual characteristics to the 
ordinary person test could contextualize the insult. The following example 
was given in Hill: “For example, if the provocation is a racial slur, the jury 
will think of an ordinary person with the racial background that forms 
the substance of the insult.”28 However, with a few notable exceptions, 
21. R v Wright, [1969] SCR 335; R v Parnerkar, [1974] SCR 449.
22. Stephen G Coughlan, “Annotation: R. v. Humaid” (2006) 37 CR (6th) 349 at 347 [Coughlan, 
“Humaid”]. 
23. R v Hill, [1986] 1 SCR 313 [Hill SCC]. At issue in Hill was the availability of provocation where 
a 16-year-old man had killed an older man who Hill alleged had made a sexual advance.
24. Ibid at para 35, Dickson CJC.
25. Thibert, supra note 5 at para 24.
26. See, e.g., Don Stuart, Steve Coughlan & Ronald J Delisle, Learning Canadian Criminal Law 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 1012–1013. See also Morris Manning & Peter Sankoff, Manning, 
Mewett & Sankoff: Criminal Law, 4th ed (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada, 2009) at 762-764. 
The authors applaud the flexibility Hill introduced, but described the decision as being “regrettably 
concise” and criticized several passages for being “terribly sloppy.”
27. See, e.g., Wayne Gorman, “Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence” (1999) 42:4 Crim LQ 
at 495-496.
28. Hill SCC, supra note 23 at para 35, Dickson CJC.
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these are not the scenarios we are seeing in the case law.29 Furthermore, 
sex and sexual orientation, in particular, have not always been added to 
the ordinary person test in a manner that reflects equality. For example, 
losing one’s self-control out of sexual jealousy has been conceptualized 
as ordinary for heterosexual men. In Hill, taking sex into account was 
essentially acknowledging that it is ordinary for a (heterosexual) man, 
faced with a same-sex advance, to respond violently. Suggesting in Hill 
that sex was relevant implies that if the accused had been a woman, a 
loss of control might not have been ordinary. Justice Wilson in her dissent 
in Hill was explicit on this point: “the fact that the victim of the sexual 
assault, the accused, is a male and that the attack is a homosexual one may 
properly be considered.”30 
In Tran, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously rejected 
provocation as a defence in a case where a racialized man had killed 
his estranged wife’s new partner and seriously injured her.31 The Court 
made it clear that not all losses of self-control will be excused; only those 
based on a “justifiable sense of being wronged.”32 The defence should 
only be successful where, “as a result of human frailties, the accused 
reacted inappropriately and disproportionately, but understandably to a 
sufficiently serious wrongful act or insult.”33 In Tran, possibly in response 
to the criticism of Thibert, the Court stressed the importance of keeping 
provocation consistent with principles of equality: 
[T]he ordinary person standard must be informed by contemporary norms 
of behaviour, including fundamental values such as the commitment to 
equality provided for in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
For example, it would be appropriate to ascribe to the ordinary person 
relevant racial characteristics if the accused were the recipient of a racial 
29. For a case where the provoking insult was based on a personal characteristic of the accused as 
intended in Hill, see R v Krasny, 2014 MBQB 237 [Krasny] which involved a young male accused 
who had significant mental and physical disabilities. He was punched and taunted by the victim at a 
party [e.g. called a “retard”]. The trial judge stated at para 63:
[N]ot only did [the victim] push and shove [the accused], he was also taunting him with 
insults and verbal abuse including calling him names related to his mental disability. 
The law is clear that an insult includes injuriously contemptuous speech or behaviour, a 
scornful utterance, as well as an action to insult another person’s self respect and cause an 
affront to his or her dignity.
The trial judge, after citing the passage on equality from Tran and section 15 of the Charter, accepted 
that the accused’s mental disability was relevant to put the victim’s insults and taunts into context and 
as to whether an ordinary person would have lost the power of self-control in response to the insults. 
The provocation defence was thus successful and the accused was convicted of manslaughter.
30. Hill SCC, supra note 23 at para 82, Wilson J.
31. Tran, supra note 7.
32. Ibid at para 22 [emphasis omitted].
33. Ibid.
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slur, but it would not be appropriate to ascribe to the ordinary person the 
characteristic of being homophobic if the accused were the recipient of 
a homosexual advance. Similarly, there can be no place in this objective 
standard for antiquated beliefs such as “adultery is the highest invasion 
of property….”34
The Court was as clear as it could be here that race and sexual orientation 
may be relevant but only where the accused was responding to, rather than 
acting on, racism or homophobia.35
Clearly, the more the objective test is personalized, and if it is only 
personalized in one direction, the less it serves as a tool to limit the excusing 
of homicidal rage. The Ontario Court of Appeal has refused to personalize 
the objective test in the other direction, i.e., it refused to consider the 
characteristics of the accused that made his loss of control less ordinary 
in the circumstances. In a 2015 case also called R. v. Hill,36 the Court of 
Appeal considered the availability of provocation where the trial judge had 
instructed the jury to consider the accused’s considerable physical size and 
strength advantage over that of his female victim in assessing whether an 
ordinary person would have lost self-control in response to a “relatively 
minor assault and insults.”37 The Court of Appeal found this to be in error 
because his provocation defence was “purely rage-based” and not based on 
fear of his young, pregnant victim.38
There is merit to the submission that by inviting the jury to compare the 
respective size of the appellant and [the victim] as part of the ordinary 
person test, the jury may have taken the trial judge to be instructing them 
that the reasonableness or even justifiability of the appellant’s response 
to [the victim’s] provocative acts was a relevant consideration in the 
application of the ordinary person test. Unlike some defences, e.g. self-
defence and duress, provocation does not measure the conduct of the 
accused against standards of reasonableness or proportionality.39
The precise nature of the provocation in this case is vague at best. The victim 
and the accused met to discuss the victim’s pregnancy (the accused was the 
biological father but both were involved in relationships with other people). 
When the accused confessed to police, he claimed that the victim fell as 
they were leaving the house and then looked at him and said, “If this baby’s 
34. Ibid at para 34.
35. See, e.g., Krasny, supra note 29.
36. 2015 ONCA 616, 330 CCC (3d) 1, 339 OAC 90 [Hill ONCA].
37. Ibid at para 70.
38. Ibid at paras 84-88.
39. Ibid at para 88.
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like, this baby’s gone, it’s your fault, I’m telling everyone it was you.”40 
He then admitted choking her for approximately three minutes. At trial, the 
story changed somewhat. According to his testimony, when the victim fell 
she claimed she would tell everyone that he had thrown her down the stairs. 
She was screaming obscenities at him and, after falling a second time, she 
struck him in the face knocking his glasses off. Regardless of which story is 
correct, after strangling her for three minutes he hid her body in the bushes, 
lied to the police and the victim’s family about his actions, and forged a 
letter from the victim saying she had gone away for a while. The Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that this was a very close case but nonetheless felt 
that provocation should have gone to the jury without any reference to the 
accused’s size advantage. If the Ontario Court of Appeal is correct that the 
accused’s size and strength advantage is not relevant, and his response does 
not have to be subjected to a standard of reasonableness, what is the normative 
function played by the ordinary person test in this case? More importantly, 
is pure rage in the face of a minor insult really something the law should 
mitigate? There were many factors in Hill suggesting that a mandatory life 
sentence, and the accompanying parole ineligibility, for murder would be 
excessive for this accused: he was young, Indigenous, apparently “a role 
model for others” and described as “considerate, non-violent and kind,”41 
although such descriptions are not unusual in the context of male violence 
against women. All of these factors might well warrant a less harsh sentence 
for murder than our law allows. However, they have nothing to do with 
provocation and the trivial insult on the part of the victim just provides an 
excuse to allow the Court to acknowledge in sentencing factors that our rigid 
law otherwise precludes. Further, the focus of the provocation defence on the 
victim’s behaviour does imply that, to some extent, it was her behaviour that 
brought about the accused’s violence and in this respect that she “asked for 
it”: Given that this case allegedly involved a minor assault by the victim, the 
new amendments would not preclude the defence of provocation. 
No area of provocation has been more controversial than its applicability 
in so-called “honour killing” cases where a racialized accused relies on his 
culture, and beliefs “typically” held in that culture, to inform the ordinary 
person. These cases involve lethal male violence against (almost always) 
a woman, often the accused’s spouse or another family member, who has 
40. Ibid at para 13.
41. Ibid at para 6.
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allegedly departed from culturally expected norms of behaviour.42 Tellingly, 
the amendments to the provocation defence were enacted with a package 
of other legislative changes in the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural 
Practices Act.43 The stated motivation behind the changes was to prevent use 
of the defence in cases of “honour killings.”44 This is so despite the fact that 
Canadian courts and juries have consistently rejected such claims.45 
In fact, it is not racialized, non-Western “others” who have benefited 
most from the provocation defence. Successful defences have been rooted 
in discriminatory assumptions very much a part of Canadian culture. 
Provocation, to a certain extent, is always a “cultural” defence—but not 
one of foreign, “barbaric” cultures contemplated by the new legislation.46 
The insults that we acknowledge as justifying mitigation reflect the values 
that we choose to accept in Canadian society. Historically, those have 
not always been equality-promoting values.47 We still see attempts to use 
provocation to justify killings in the face of male jealousy when women 
try to leave a relationship and where a man responds with deadly force to 
a same-sex advance. While some might argue that we have moved past 
these types of cases with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Tran,48 this problematic reasoning is still with us post-Tran.49 The new 
amendments will not rule out the defence where, as in many of these cases, 
there is an allegation that the victim assaulted the accused before deadly 
force was used.50 
42. See, e.g., R v Humaid, 2006 CanLII 12287 (ONCA), 81 OR (3d) 456 (CA) [Humaid]; Rosemary 
Cairns Way, “Culture, Religion and the Ordinary Person: An Essay on R. v. Humaid” (2009) 41:1 
Ottawa L Rev 1; Sherene H Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslms from Western Law and 
Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
43. Bill S-7, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Civil Marriage Act 
and the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015 
(assented to 18 June 2015), SC 2015, c 29, s 7.
44. Senate, Standing Committee on Human Rights, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 41st Parl, 
2nd Sess, Issue 14 (8 December 2014) [Senate Standing Committee, 8 December 2014].
45. See, e.g., Humaid, supra note 42; R v Li, 2007 ONCA 136, 221 OAC 179 [Li]; Pascale Fournier, 
Pascal McDougall & Anna R Dekker, “Dishonour, Provocation and Culture: Through the Beholder’s 
Eye?” (2012) 16:2 Can Crim L Rev 161; R v Shafia, 2016 ONCA 812, 341 CCC (3d) 354, [2016] OJ 
No 5627 (QL) [Shafia].
46. We are not the first to describe provocation as a cultural defence. See, e.g., Stephen G Coughlan, 
“The Omission of Provocation from a General Part” in Don Stuart, RJ Deslisle & Allan Manson, 
eds, Towards A Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) 
243 at 246.
47. Coughlan, “Humaid,” supra note 22. 
48. Kent W Roach et al, “Vandalizing the Criminal Code with Irrational and Arbitrary Restrictions 
on Provocation” (2015) 62 Crim LQ 403.
49. See, e.g., R v Rasberry, 2017 ABCA 135 [Rasberry]; R v Angelis, 2013 ONCA 70, 296 CCC (3d) 
143, 99 CR (6th) 315 [Angelis].
50. See Rasberry, ibid.
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2. The impossibility of incorporating equality into the defence of 
provocation
Rosemary Cairns Way has argued that “the most destabilizing…truth about 
criminal law which has emerged over the last 30 years [of the Charter] 
is that the criminal law raises equality issues.”51 Cairns Way suggests 
that “incorporating equality [into substantive criminal law] requires 
deliberate attention to perspective, context, power, vulnerability, presence 
and absence.”52 Attention to substantive equality complicates the classic 
conception of the criminal law as about balancing the state power to punish 
against the individual rights of accused persons. It involves “thinking 
about the overall burdens and benefits of criminal prohibitions,”53 about the 
unequal positions of certain groups of victims and perpetrators, and about 
the context of social inequality in which the criminal law has developed 
and is enforced. Reforms to sexual assault law in the Charter era have 
been perhaps the most salient examples of substantive equality informing 
criminal law doctrine.54 But what does it mean to say that the defence of 
provocation must be consistent with values of equality? Formal equality 
would mean that the defence is equally available to all groups of accused 
persons. Historically, this has not been the case for provocation but the 
defence is now at least formally available to anyone charged with murder. 
However, when one examines the types of killings committed by men 
and women, for example, we learn that provocation is still largely a male 
defence because of the way the defence has been interpreted and applied in 
conjunction with the reality that culpable homicides, and especially those 
based on out-of-control rage, are overwhelmingly committed by men.55 
Substantive equality “seeks to accommodate the varied needs and 
experiences of subordinated groups.”56 In “Contextualizing Criminal 
51. Rosemary Cairns Way, “Attending to Equality: Criminal Law, the Charter and Competitive 
Truths” (2012) 57 SCLR (2d) 39 at 40 [Cairns Way, “Attending to Equality”].
52. Ibid.
53. Christine Boyle, “The Role of Equality in the Criminal Law” (1994) 58:1 Sask L Rev 203 at 207.
54. Cairns Way, “Attending to Equality,” supra note 51 at 49-51. But see Emma Cunliffe, “Sexual 
Assault Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada: Losing Sight of Substantive Equality?” (2012) 57 
SCLR 295 (discussing the ongoing challenge of infusing sexual assault law with equality).
55. Danielle Tyson, “Victoria’s New Homicide Laws: Provocative Reforms or More Stories of 
Women ‘asking for it’” (2011) 23:2 Current Issues Crim Just 203 at 208 [Tyson, “Victoria’s New 
Homicide Laws”]; Caroline Forell, “Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the 
United States, Canada and Australia” (2006) 14:1 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 27 [Forell, “Gender 
Equality”]; Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide for Battered 
Women: A Comparative Analysis of Laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand” (2012) 34:3 Sydney 
L Rev 467 at 482 [Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide”]. See also Stella Tarrant, “The 
‘Specific Triggering Incident’ in Provocation: Is the Law Gender Biased?” (1996) 26:1 UW Austl L 
Rev 190 for an analysis of whether the requirement is discriminatory under Australian law.
56. See Forell, “Gender Equality,” ibid at 29.
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Defences,” we argued that locating a defence in its factual and social 
context is an important step towards achieving substantive equality.57 We 
suggested that there are two ways in which context should inform an analysis 
of defences. First, the context should help us understand the accused’s 
actions. Second, and more importantly, a contextual inquiry should help 
“to locate the defence itself within its social and historical context and 
to reveal biases and inequalities reflected therein.”58 The best example of 
the Court recognizing context in a defence can be found in the decision 
in R. v. Lavallee,59 where self-defence was located within the context of 
the historical inequality of women, the relative inequality between men 
and women in terms of size and physical strength, and the history of 
self-defence which evolved with male-to-male combat in mind. This was 
easier for self-defence because it was the absence of the defence for some 
accused that created inequality. The task is more difficult with provocation 
where it is the values underlying the defence itself that challenge equality. 
Attempting to imbue the provocation defence with the value of substantive 
equality requires rejecting a number of the discriminatory assumptions 
about what types of conduct will lead ordinary people to lose self-control 
and even about whether an angry loss of self-control should be mitigating 
at all. Just because some men react to being rejected by women or to a 
same-sex sexual advance with lethal violence does not make it ordinary 
and does not necessarily make it worthy of our compassion. Caroline 
Forell argues that a more radical approach is required:
Substantive gender equality insists that the law take into account and 
respond to the actual effect of a rule on both men and women, thereby 
better assuring that justice for all is achieved. It requires more than just 
making the provocation defense available to both men and women who 
kill out of jealousy and rage, or out of fear and despair. Instead, applying 
substantive equality would mean that killing in a heat of passion out 
of sexual possessiveness would no longer be an acceptable basis for a 
claim of provocation because everyone has a right to sexual and physical 
autonomy. Applying substantive equality would also mean that killing 
one’s batterer out of fear would often be a basis for self-defense because 
everyone has a right to defend him or herself against physical harm. 
If substantive gender equality were considered adequately, killings out 
of jealousy and rage would result in murder convictions, while most 
killings out of fear and despair would result in acquittals.60
57. Isabel Grant & Debra Parkes, “Contextualizing Criminal Defences: Exploring the Contribution 
of Justice Bertha Wilson” in Kim Brooks, ed, Justice Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s Difference 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 153 [Grant & Parkes, “Contextualizing Criminal Defences”].
58. Ibid at 154.
59. R v Lavallee, 1990 CanLII 95 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 852 [Lavallee].
60. Forell, “Gender Equality,” supra note 55 at 30 (citations omitted).
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Aya Gruber suggests that attempting to bring substantive equality into 
defences and other criminal law doctrines “has a tendency to reduce to 
the notion that we should simply do whatever favours the (identified) 
woman in any given case.”61 But given the extent to which women have 
been disadvantaged by the historical development of legal doctrine 
around male violence, to some extent it is not surprising if reform efforts 
appear to be focused on maximizing protection for women and other 
marginalized groups, and trying to right the historical inequality. With 
these cautions in mind, we demonstrate that developments in the law of 
provocation have not yet achieved substantive equality. We examine two 
contexts in which inadequate attention to equality has resulted in an over-
inclusive application of the defence: men killing their female partners and 
“homosexual panic” cases. We also briefly discuss the difficulty in raising 
provocation for women who kill their abusers, where the under-inclusive 
application of the defence has been problematic. We are not the first to 
critique these types of cases62 but it is disconcerting that the call to heed 
Charter values in Tran has not eliminated them.
3. Provocation and  intimate femicide
Every year, approximately 60 women in Canada are killed by their 
(former) intimate partners. Women are at greatest risk when they separate, 
or announce their intent to separate, from their male partners.63 Canadian 
statistics suggest that, while the number of spousal homicides has remained 
relatively constant in recent years, the number of female victims has 
increased while the number of male victims is in decline.64 Women commit 
spousal homicide far less often than men65 and for different reasons. Men 
are more likely to kill out of sexual jealousy, a sense of entitlement to 
their female partners or a twisted sense of male honour.66 In cases where 
provocation is at issue, threats to leave the relationship67 and/or taunts 
61. Aya Gruber, “A Provocative Defense” (2015) 103:2 Cal L Rev 273 at 313.
62. See, e.g., The Response of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies to Reforming 
Criminal Code Defences: Provocation, Self-Defence and Defence of Property, supra note 1; St. Lewis 
& Galloway, supra note 1; Côté, Majury & Sheehy, supra note 1; N Kathleen (Sam) Banks, “The 
‘Homosexual Panic’ Defence in Canadian Criminal Law” (1997), 1 CR (5th) 371.
63. Isabel Grant, “Intimate Femicide: A Study of Sentencing Trends for Men Who Kill Their 
Intimate Partners” (2010) 47:3 Alta L Rev 779 at 780 [Grant, “Intimate Femicide”].
64. Maire Sinha, “Family violence in Canada: A statistical profile, 2011” (2013) 85:2 Juristat 1 at 47. 
These numbers underestimate the scope of the problem because men also kill their former partner’s 
new male partners, which are killings that are not labelled as spousal in nature.
65. One study found that more than 75% of all spousal homicides in Canada were committed by men 
against women: Valerie Pottie Bunge, “National Trends in Intimate Partner Homicides, 1974–2000” 
(2002) 22:5 Juristat 1 at 13.
66. Ibid at 7.
67. R v Pasqualino, 2008 ONCA 554, 233 CCC (3d) 319, 239 OAC 59.
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about sexual inadequacy68 are sometimes the provoking insult. Women are 
more likely to raise provocation where they have killed an abusive spouse 
out of fear or despair where self-defence is likely the more appropriate 
defence, although difficulties may arise in its application.69 As described 
by Danielle Tyson, provocation does not typically fit the circumstances of 
women who kill an intimate partner:
When women kill an intimate partner, they typically do so in circumstances 
where they are not responding to a specific triggering incident that 
is legally required before a successful defence of provocation can be 
made out. Rather, when women kill they are usually responding to a 
past history of violence and abuse by the deceased. Although deserving 
of mitigation, women who kill their violent abusers often fail to satisfy 
the rules and requirements that structure the partial defence resulting in 
either the distortion or exclusion of their experiences.
In contrast, men who kill their intimate partners or ex-partners usually 
kill in response to much slighter provocation—she either ‘nagged’, 
‘taunted’, ‘insulted’ or ‘goaded’ him, ‘flirted’ with another man, ‘flaunted’ 
her infidelity, left the relationship or expressed a desire to leave him. 
Men who kill in this context, however, have been able to rely on the 
defence of provocation with relative ease.70
A 1998 Canadian Department of Justice study found 115 cases in which 
provocation was raised:
62 involved domestic homicides: 55 in which men killed women, and 
7 in which women killed men. The remaining 53 cases involved men 
killed by men, and of those, 16 involved allegations of a “homosexual 
advance”, 8 involved an altercation over intimate relations with the 
perpetrator’s current or estranged female partner, and the remaining 29 
involved men who had no special relationships.71
Two Canadian studies have examined the success rate of the defence of 
provocation in cases involving gendered intimate violence. In a study of 
sentencing for spousal homicides committed by men, Isabel Grant found 
that provocation was argued in 37 of 252 spousal murder cases and was 
successful in only seven of the cases, although in two additional cases the 
Court of Appeal sent the case back for a new trial because of errors in the 
68. Ibid; R v Kimpe, 2010 ONCA 812, 271 OAC 21.
69. Grant, “Intimate Femicide,” supra note 63; Jenny Morgan, “Provocation Law and Facts: Dead 
Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told About Them” (1997) 21:1 Melbourne UL Rev 237 at 256-257.
70. Tyson, “Victoria’s New Homicide Laws,” supra note 55 at 208 (citations omitted).
71. Department of Justice, “Reforming Criminal Code Defences: Provocation, Self-defence, and 
Defence of Property” (1998) at 4, cited in Pickard et al, supra note 18 at 812.
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charge on provocation.72 However, there were many more cases where 
provocation was put to the jury and was unsuccessful on the facts. Pascale 
Fournier and her colleagues examined honour killings in Canada which, 
while not all spousal in nature, are based on notions of gendered entitlement 
to control women’s sexuality.73 The authors concluded that the success 
rate for the defence was 11% for non-Western or Other(ed)74 defendants 
and 25% for Western defendants.75 This latter finding demonstrates the 
relatively high rate of success for the defence when Western men kill their 
spouses or other family members. The significant differential between 
the two groups suggests that we recognize the problematic dimensions 
of importing discriminatory “cultural values” into cases dealing with 
an accused from foreign cultures but we do not even recognize we are 
importing cultural values when dealing with Western accused.76 As the 
authors conclude, “however right the harsh punishment of honour crimes 
may be, this has the potential to conceal Western femicidal behaviour, an 
unintended consequence we should be wary of.”77
The high point of incorporating discriminatory values into provocation 
was also the high point of subjectifying the ordinary person test in 
provocation doctrine. In Thibert, the accused confronted his estranged 
spouse and her new partner with a loaded rifle in a parking lot. He claimed 
he wanted to speak to his wife alone. Her new partner, the victim, told the 
accused, “Come on big fellow, shoot me,” as he stood with the accused’s 
wife in front of him. The accused shot him with a rifle with which he had 
originally planned to kill the deceased or his wife, and later apparently 
changed that plan to suicide.78 The majority held that provocation should 
have gone to the jury, and that the ordinary person should be constructed 
as the married man faced with the breakup of his marriage, implying that 
a loss of self-control is ordinary in this context. The dissent pointed out in 
powerful terms that “no one has either an emotional or proprietary right 
72. Grant, “Intimate Femicide,” supra note 63.
73. Fournier, McDougall & Dekker, supra note 45.
74. Ibid. This study analyzed a series of Canadian cases of intimate femicide from 1990–2010 
in which the male defendants raised the provocation defence. In categorizing the defendants’ 
backgrounds as either “Western” or “Other”(ed), the authors relied on the names of the parties and 
the other information revealed in the decisions. Cases in which no mention was made of a particular 
“other” ethnic origin were included in the “Western” category. 
75. Ibid. For a description of similar findings in other jurisdictions see Danielle Tyson, Sex, 
Culpability and the Defence of Provocation (New York: Routledge, 2013) at 38-39. [Tyson, Sex, 
Culpability and Provocation].
76. Razack, supra note 42.
77. Fournier, McDougall & Dekker, supra note 45 at 188.
78. Thibert, supra note 5 at paras 26, 39, 42.
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or interest in his spouse that would justify the loss of self-control that the 
[accused] exhibited.”79
While this type of reasoning is less common after Tran, remnants of 
it can be seen in the post-Tran case law. For example, in R. v. Angelis,80 
the accused was charged with murdering his wife after smothering or 
strangling her during a physical altercation in front of their two young 
children. He testified that she suddenly attacked him, scratching his face 
and clawing his penis. His young daughter testified to the contrary that the 
two had been fighting about money. The context was that the accused had 
recently learned that the victim had been having a long-term relationship 
with another man and wanted out of the marriage. Apparently the accused 
straddled the victim, covered her mouth with his hand, and held her down 
to “defend” himself. She weighed 95 pounds and was 4'9" tall. He weighed 
150 pounds and was 5'6" tall. After her death he did not administer CPR 
even though he was a trained nurse, and he waited three or four hours 
before calling 911. The trial judge refused to put provocation to the jury 
and the jury convicted the accused of murder, thus clearly rejecting both 
self-defence and the argument that the Crown had failed to prove mens 
rea.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was wrong to refuse to 
put provocation to the jury. The disagreement in this case was actually 
about the subjective component of provocation although the Court’s 
analysis shed some light on the construction of ordinariness in spousal 
violence. The Court held that there was evidence to support the subjective 
component of provocation beyond the accused’s denial that he was 
angry.81 The Court of Appeal cited four pieces of evidence to support the 
assertion of provocation. First, a neighbour had heard the accused yell 
the word “bitch” at his wife mere moments before the struggle ended, 
thus suggesting the attack was sudden. Second, he killed his wife in front 
of their two children even though he undeniably loved his children. This 
fact apparently demonstrated that he was not in control when he killed 
his wife. Third, the killing was out of character for the accused: “it is 
hard to understand why a mild-mannered civil servant with no history of 
violence or abuse in his relationship with his wife would turn on her in an 
instant and then panic after—unless he acted out of such rage.”82 Finally, 
the fact that the victim had attacked the most intimate part of his body, his 
79. Thibert, ibid at para 65.
80. Angelis, supra note 49.
81. Ibid at para 41.
82. Ibid.
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penis, also led the Court to conclude that it could be inferred that he lost 
self-control. The Court would have substituted a verdict of manslaughter 
on the basis of these errors about provocation but because the trial judge 
made other errors, a new trial was ordered. 
These conclusions reflect a number of problematic stereotypes about 
domestic violence and its perpetrators which are relied upon by the 
appellate court to support provocation. The suggestion that mild-mannered 
civil servants do not abuse their wives unless provoked belies the fact that 
domestic violence exists across all social groups. We also do not have 
access to the victim’s account of their relationship. The notion that violence 
is “out of character” for an accused is often used to minimize the impact 
of domestic violence.83 The horrific fact that two young children watched 
their mother be killed is treated as supporting a defence of provocation. In 
fact, social science literature demonstrates that the presence of children 
generally does not protect women from lethal violence and that, in fact, far 
too many children witness their mothers being killed.84 
In R. v. Khairi,85 the accused killed his wife by brutally slicing through 
her neck and voicebox and stabbing her multiple times. The killing took 
place at the family apartment where they lived with their six children 
after she had told him she was going to leave the relationship and take 
the children with her. While the jury rejected the defence of provocation, 
it is concerning that the trial judge found an air of reality to the defence 
since there appears to be no evidence of a sufficiently grave insult that 
could trigger the defence. Clearly some trial judges still take the view 
that a woman communicating that she is leaving an abusive relationship 
constitutes sufficient provocation to put the defence to the jury.
Another line of cases demonstrates that alleged taunts by a woman 
about a man’s sexual prowess can trigger a provocation defence.86 This 
issue perpetuates the stereotype that men have no control over actions 
83. See, e.g., R v Pakoo, 2004 MBCA 157, 198 CCC (3d) 122, 25 CR (6th) 277, 198 CCC (3d) 122, 
25 CR (6th) 277; R v McCowan, 2010 MBCA 45, 251 Man R (2d) 295.
84. Grant, “Intimate Femicide,” supra note 63 at 780-781. One study which examined intimate 
femicides from 1974–1994 found that 100 children witnessed their mothers being killed: Rosemary 
Gartner, Myrna Dawson & Maria Crawford, “Woman Killing: Intimate Femicide in Ontario, 1974–
1994” (1998) 26 Resources for Feminist Research 151 at 163.
85. 2015 ONCA 279, [2015] OJ No 2054 (QL).
86. R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290 [Stone] involved a man who brutally 
stabbed his wife 47 times in response to her alleged verbal abuse of him which included a reference 
to his poor sexual performance. While it is not possible to determine from the judgment whether 
provocation or lack of mens rea led to the jury verdict of manslaughter, the Supreme Court of Canada 
upheld the conclusion that the victim’s provocation could be considered as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing even though the mitigation of provocation had already reduced the crime from murder to 
manslaughter. 
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related to sexual activity and that an insult about their sexual prowess 
necessarily makes a loss of self-control ordinary. Losing self-control 
over an insult to one’s sexual prowess is a gendered rage response that is 
normalized in our law and culture. We could find no such cases involving 
women killing men for such insults. 
The recent decision of R. v. Evans,87 while not a spousal case, is 
instructive about the role of statements regarding the accused’s sexual 
performance. The accused’s evidence was that he was drunk and could not 
get an erection. The victim, a woman he had just met that night, mentioned 
that he was probably too drunk to get an erection. The accused argued that 
this comment might have been what caused him to fly into a rage and kill 
her, because he took her pointing out this obvious fact as “being made fun 
of.”88 The Court of Appeal rightly rejected her statement as the basis for 
a provocation defence. However, the Court suggested that, had she made 
fun of him, provocation might well have gone to the jury:
This [the victim’s pointing out that the accused was too drunk to get an 
erection] is not evidence capable of supporting the objective element 
of the test so as to give an air of reality to the defence of provocation. 
It is not evidence of a wrongful insult that, in the circumstances, would 
deprive an ordinary person of self-control. The evidence does not go 
so far as to suggest that Ms. Parisien mocked, taunted or ridiculed the 
appellant or that she might have done those things.89
Being mocked about one’s sexual performance is presumably an upsetting 
experience, but it should be one that men are expected to withstand and 
not respond to with lethal rage. As will be discussed below, the new 
amendments may well rule out provocation in some of these cases. 
However, an allegation of an assault, even a minor one, against the accused 
by the victim may open the door to provocation in these cases.
4. Women who kill their batterers 
Provocation also disadvantages women as accused persons in intimate 
partner homicides. The defence is difficult to sustain where women who 
have been subjected to ongoing abuse kill their abusers.90 The loss of self-
control paradigm and its corresponding suddenness requirement fail to 
capture the dynamics of these killings. As Jeremy Horder describes:
87. 2012 BCCA 209, 321 BCAC 295.
88. Ibid at para 63.
89. Ibid at para 64 [emphasis added].
90. See Jeremy Horder, “Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence” (2005) 
25:1 Oxford J Leg Stud 123.
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the sense of a privileged access to the defence that may be obtained 
by those—perhaps, mainly men—who have a ‘shoot from the hip 
mentality’…as compared with those—perhaps, mainly women—whose 
response to provocation needs to be more measured because they are 
confronting someone known to be stronger and more aggressive.91 
Someone whose fear builds slowly over time in response to the 
provocative acts of the victim will lose the mitigation if she had time to 
for her “passion to cool.”92 Elizabeth Sheehy in her book on defending 
battered women on trial makes this point in response to a statement from 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Malott93 that the accused did not 
appear to act in a fit of passion:
This begs the question of what “passion” looks like for battered 
women who kill. Is a woman who has been psychologically damaged 
and numbed by violence, who appears to be emotionally detached, 
necessarily showing “a lack of passion”?94
Sheehy also notes that, while men can often kill women with their bare 
hands, women often must resort to weapons which can work against them 
in the assessment of suddenness. 
The difficulty in raising provocation for abused women highlights the 
degree to which the standard at the heart of the defence—loss of self-
control—is profoundly gendered and remains rooted in the experience of 
heterosexual male rage that is ill-suited to providing mitigation for women 
accused. Problems also arise when one looks at killings by men in the 
context of a same-sex sexual advance to which we now turn.
5. Provocation and “Homosexual Panic”
As mentioned earlier, the Court in Tran stated that homophobia is not a 
characteristic that should be attributed to the ordinary person. Yet post-
Tran, judges have found an air of reality to the defence of provocation 
raised by accused men in relation to vicious attacks on men they allege 
sexually assaulted them. We have seen three such cases, post-Tran, where 
provocation was raised and where the verdict was manslaughter or the 
case was sent back for new trial.95 In one of these cases, R. v. Bouchard,96 
91. Ibid at 125.
92. In R v Daniels, [1983] NWTJ No 29 (CA) [Daniels] the court recognized this kind of slow fuse 
provocation after a long period of abuse by the accused’s spouse, but this case is exceptional.
93. (1996), 30 OR (3d) 609 (CA), aff’d [1998] 1 SCR 123.
94. Sheehy, Defending Battered Women, supra note 11 at 271.
95. R v Peterson, 2012 MBQB 305, 285 Man R (2d) 172 [Peterson]; R v Bouchard, 2013 ONCA 
791, 305 CCC (3d) 240, 314 OAC 113 [Bouchard ONCA], aff’d 2014 SCC 64, [2014] 3 SCR 283 
[Bouchard SCC] new trial ordered; Rasberry, supra note 49.
96. Bouchard ONCA, ibid.
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the new trial was granted on the basis that the provocation was relevant 
to a lack of mens rea, and in another, R. v. Rasberry,97 the accused also 
testified that the victim threatened to sexually assault both him and his 
wife. As further discussed below, in these three cases, as well as one 
known as KRB,98 decided shortly before Tran, and R. v. Rothgordt 99 in 
which the defence was found to have an air of reality at the accused’s first 
trial, the assumed ordinariness of homophobic rage played a role. Self-
defence would have been a more appropriate defence in all of these cases, 
but the decisions are based on provocation because the excessive force 
used precluded self-defence. In the light of recent judicial and legislative 
efforts to limit the defence of provocation, it is important to consider the 
continued salience of “homosexual panic” as a basis for the defence, even 
though these cases are not numerous.
In R. v. Peterson,100 the accused testified that he killed his friend and 
associate in the drug trade after the accused awoke one evening and found 
the victim, another man, attempting to perform oral sex on him. The accused 
struck the victim at least nine times with a hammer, crushing his skull. 
The forensic evidence showed that the victim was either incapacitated 
or unconscious when many of the blows were struck. Provocation was 
left with the jury and they convicted the accused of manslaughter. In the 
course of her reasons for sentence, the judge stated that the jury must have 
concluded that the victim attempting to perform oral sex on the accused 
“would have caused a reasonable person in his circumstances to lose self-
control.”101
In Rothgordt the accused killed a man he met in an online chat room 
for men interested in sex with other men.102 The accused did not testify 
but the defence relied on his statement to the police in which he alleged 
that the victim had come on to him without his consent. At the first trial, 
provocation was left with the jury, along with intoxication and self-defence, 
97. Rasberry, supra note 49.
98. R v KRB, 2007 NBQB 359, 321 NBR (2d) 371, [2007] NBJ No 413 (QL) [KRB]. The accused 
successfully raised provocation in a judge-alone trial. He testified that the victim, another man who 
was his friend, sexually assaulted him while asleep in the friend’s car. KBR testified that he pushed the 
friend away, jumped out of the car and grabbed a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle from the backseat, fatally 
shooting his friend in the chest. The reasons for decision do not indicate the nature of the alleged 
sexual assault.
99. In R v Rothgordt, 2013 BCCA 37 [Rothgordt], the defence was left with the jury at the accused’s 
first trial, but failed on the merits. The second trial was by judge alone and Justice Arnold-Bailey found 
no basis for provocation.  The accused has again appealed his conviction for second degree murder.
100. Peterson, supra note 95. 
101. Ibid at para 22.
102. R v Rothgordt, supra note 99.
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but the jury convicted him of second degree murder.103 As in Peterson, the 
killing was very violent: the accused struck the victim numerous times in 
the head with a hammer.104 
Even when provocation fails, evidence that an accused was provoked 
is relevant to mens rea and may have the impact of reducing a murder 
conviction to manslaughter. In Bouchard,105 for example, the accused 
and the victim were former coworkers and friends who often drank 
together. There was some evidence of prior sexual activity between the 
two men. On the night of the killing, the two men had gone to a concert 
and become “quite drunk” by the time the concert ended. The victim had 
allegedly made several sexual advances earlier in the evening that had 
been rebuffed. The provoking act occurred when the victim planted a “wet 
kiss” on the accused’s cheek and told the accused that he loved him. The 
accused then stomped the victim to death, leaving him in tall grass several 
metres from the road. The accused testified that the “wet kiss” brought 
back memories of a babysitter who had sexually assaulted him as a child. 
Two defences were put to the jury: a lack of mens rea for murder and 
provocation. The jury rejected both defences and convicted the accused 
of second degree murder. Again, we question putting provocation to the 
jury in this case. Is a single kiss, and a protestation of love, evidence of 
an insult that is sufficiently serious that it could generate a loss of self-
control in an ordinary person? The jury evidently answered this question 
in the negative, but the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the accused’s 
appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the victim’s conduct was 
relevant to the overall inquiry into whether the accused had the requisite 
mens rea for murder. In other words, provoking conduct that falls short 
of the requirements of s. 232 may nonetheless be sufficient to negate the 
accused’s mens rea for murder. The Court held that when evidence of 
provocation is used to negate the mens rea for murder, the limits imposed 
by the statutory definition of provocation, such as the “ordinary person” 
requirement, do not apply. This result was upheld by the SCC without 
reasons.106
The decision in Bouchard is problematic for several reasons. First, 
allowing provocation to go to the jury in this case, necessarily embraces 
103. Ibid. The accused was initially convicted of second degree murder, but this conviction was 
set aside due to improper jury instructions (2013 BCCA 37). At his second trial, the accused was 
convicted of second degree murder (2014 BCSC 1215, [2014] BCJ No 1398 (QL)). This decision was 
overruled on appeal, 2017 BCCA 230.
104. Ibid. See also KRB, supra note 98.
105. Bouchard ONCA, supra note 95.
106. Bouchard SCC, supra note 95. Bouchard was convicted of murder at the second trial: R v 
Bouchard, 2016 ONSC 4484.
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homophobic assumptions about responses to non-violent same-sex 
advances by affirming the reasoning that it is ordinary to respond to a non-
violent same-sex advance, such as a “wet kiss,” with lethal violence.107 
Second, Bouchard opens a back door into a manslaughter verdict 
even where an ordinary person would not have lost self-control (albeit 
through the doctrinal route of negating the mens rea for murder). This is 
particularly problematic because there will be no safeguard of an objective 
test to ensure that unreasonable responses based on toxic masculinity or 
homophobia will not serve as mitigating factors.108 
The Canadian Judicial Council’s model jury charge on provocation 
includes a mention in a footnote that the characteristic of homophobia 
should not be attributed to the ordinary person.109 However, juries are to be 
instructed that the accused’s gender and sexual orientation should be taken 
into account to the extent they are relevant. Yet to do so in these cases 
can be problematic. In Rothgordt, where the defence theory was that the 
accused was sexually curious or confused, jury speculation about his sexual 
orientation (which was not at all clear) does not assist in understanding the 
nature of the alleged insult unless the ordinary person can be homophobic. 
Unspoken in these cases is the idea that, if the accused had been gay 
himself, provocation might not be available. The decision at the second 
trial in Rothgordt provides a rare example of a court taking these concerns 
seriously. Justice Arnold-Bailey stated, “Moreover, in this day and age I 
do not consider it likely that ‘homosexual panic’ will often, if ever, provide 
a valid basis upon which to find provocation.”110
Remember that the example given by Dickson CJ in Hill of when 
personal characteristics might be relevant was that of a racialized accused 
being subjected to a racist insult. The analogy for sexual orientation would 
be a gay man or woman losing self-control as a result of a homophobic 
insult. The facts in R. v. Reid111 come close to the kind of insult envisioned 
107. The alleged conduct by victims in other homosexual panic cases (e.g., Peterson, Rasberry) 
cannot be considered “non-violent” and we do not mean to suggest that sexual assaults—whether 
experienced by men or women—are not violent acts. As discussed further below, the relevant defence 
in such cases should be self-defence and any limitations within that defence should be addressed 
directly rather than through provocation. 
108. If a killing is reduced from murder to manslaughter based on a lack of mens rea, the defence of 
provocation should not arise given that it only applies to killings that are otherwise murder. The first 
question should be the mens rea question and only if the intent to kill is found should provocation be 
considered.
109.  Canadian Judicial Council, “Provocation—In force July 16, 2015,” online: Canadian Judicial 
Council <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/lawyers_en.asp?selMenu=lawyers_provocation_en.asp>.
110. Rothgordt, supra note 99.
111. 2015 BCSC 835 [Reid].
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in Hill. The facts suggest that the accused was born intersex,112 raised as a 
boy, and as an adult had surgery to transition to be a woman. The accused 
engaged in what was found to be a consensual sexual encounter with a man 
who, on discovering she was transgender, started berating her viciously, 
calling her a faggot and other epithets. The victim also allegedly assaulted 
her, to which she responded with deadly force, hitting him several times 
with a baseball bat and causing his death. The defence of self-defence 
failed in this case because it was found that the force used by the accused 
was excessive. Silverman J. recognized that one’s “gender and sexual 
identity” is relevant to the provocation inquiry. In particular, he accepted 
the Crown’s concession that the victim’s words and actions “could be taken 
as a dehumanizing attack on Ms. Reid’s sense of identity and self-worth, 
as gender is a legitimate core aspect of self-identity and self-worth.”113 The 
accused was convicted of manslaughter on the basis of provocation. In our 
view, any principled basis to mitigate Reid’s sentence in this case should 
be rooted in an understanding that she was defending herself against a 
man who, it seems, flew into a transphobic rage at the realization she 
was transgender. It is only necessary to shoehorn our desire to mitigate 
the sentence here into the ill-fitting defence of provocation because the 
mandatory minimum sentences for murder preclude consideration of the 
circumstances of the accused. 
Self-defence should, of course, be open to both men and women who 
are defending themselves against sexual or other assaults but that defence 
requires that the defensive response be reasonable in the circumstances.114 
We are not saying that an accused responding violently to a sexual assault 
should never form the basis for mitigation of a murder sentence, but rather 
that the presumed sexual orientation of the victim should not render a sexual 
assault a provocative act based on some discriminatory construction of 
masculinity. While women are overwhelmingly more likely to be victims 
112. The decision uses the word “hermaphrodite” which is considered a stigmatizing term. See 
Intersex Society of North America, “On the Word ‘Hermaphrodite,’” online: <http://www.isna.org/
node/16>. 
113. Reid, supra note 111 at para 100.
114. It is interesting to note that when the defence of provocation was abolished in the Australian state 
of Victoria, a new offence of “defensive homicide” was introduced. Ramsey, supra note 17. Some 
have argued that the notion of a mitigated form of “defensive homicide” in fact brings in through 
the back door values that were rejected in the provocation context: see, e.g., Tyson, “Victoria’s New 
Homicide Laws,” supra note 55 at 212-214; Hunter & Tyson, “The Implementation of Feminist Law 
Reforms,” supra note 17.
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of sexual assault, we do not see women responding to unwanted sexual 
advances (whether heterosexual or same-sex) with lethal violence.115 
II. Assessing the amendments 
On 16 July 2015 amendments to subsection 232(2) were enacted as part of 
the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act.116 As mentioned 
above, the wrongful act or insult has been replaced by “conduct of the 
victim that would constitute an indictable offence under this Act that is 
punishable by five or more years of imprisonment.” 
The apparent justification for the changes was to prevent perpetrators 
of so-called “honour killings” from invoking the provocation defence. 
Then Immigration Minister Chris Alexander made a connection between 
the need to deter honour killings and the amendments before the Senate 
Standing Committee:
The defence of honour as a basis for provocation has been used dozens of 
times in Canada and its very existence under our criminal law weakens 
the defence that women and girls deserve to have in their own homes 
from their own relatives. We should not be allowing there to be any 
concept of family honour, however construed, as a mitigating factor for 
the murder of a family member.…It could be used in the future and its 
very existence sends a message to men….That their honour is somehow 
at stake and could be used to defend them in a court of law from the 
charge of murder.117 
When pressed on these “dozens” of cases, the only case the Minister could 
name was R. v. Stone,118 a case in which provocation was probably the 
reason for reducing a spousal murder to manslaughter but there was no 
evidence that the accused was a racialized man. The authors have not been 
able to find a single case where provocation has succeeded in the context 
115. The only case that we are aware of where a woman killed in response to sexual violence is R v 
Magliaro, [1981] NSJ No 115 where the accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter after killing a man 
who, after apparently consensual sex, forced her to perform fellatio. The accused had been sexually 
assaulted as a teenager and had a history of mental health issues.
116. Bill S-7, supra note 43.
117. Senate, Standing Committee on Human Rights, Evidence, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, Issue 14 
(4 December 2014).
118. Stone, supra note 86.
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of a so-called spousal honour killing.119 So-called honour killings do 
happen in Canada, although relatively rarely compared to spousal killings 
generally.120 It is, therefore, important to consider the implications of this 
provision beyond the context of “honour” killings. Statements of the then 
Minister reveal that the government was trying to limit the defence to 
cases where the victim assaulted the accused:
On the defence of provocation, we’re very confident of the amendment 
that is proposed here. We’re saying that the only provocation that might 
be acceptable in a court of law is very serious violence by the victim. 
Indictable offences punishable by up to five years or more are violent 
offences.121
There are two significant changes in the new s. 232. First, the term “act or 
insult” has been changed to “conduct.” It is not clear whether this would 
rule out words alone as the basis for provocation or whether words can 
constitute conduct. Regardless, the second change requiring an indictable 
offence would mean that the only possible words that could trigger 
provocation would be those that constitute assault,122 possibly the crime 
of uttering threats under s. 264.1 or criminal harassment under s. 264. The 
second and more important change is the requirement that the conduct 
of the victim constitute an indictable offence subject to imprisonment of 
five years or more. This new criterion tells us little about how Canadian 
society expects an ordinary person to react. It is a somewhat arbitrary 
line that is devoid of context as to the types of indictable offences that 
119. Fournier and her colleagues found that there were two cases (both before Tran was decided) in 
which provocation was successful for a non-Western/Canadian accused killing an intimate partner 
in their data but in neither of these cases was there a claim based on “honour”: Fournier, McDougall 
& Dekker, supra note 45. In Li, supra note 45 the Court of Appeal upheld a successful provocation 
case for a non-Western accused who killed his wife in anger after they had argued and had apparently 
engaged in a minor struggle. There was no mention of honour in the case, nor was there any indication 
that the killing was connected to the accused’s beliefs about what was acceptable in his culture. Nor 
was there any suggestion of culture being relevant to the defence in R c Chouaiby, 1994 CanLII 5910 
(QCCA).
120. A rare example is the much-publicized Shafia case in which a young woman’s father, mother, and 
brother were convicted of first degree murder in her death, and the deaths of three other female family 
members, and those convictions upheld on appeal: supra note 45.
121. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Evidence, 41st Parl, 
2nd Sess, No 43 (31 March 2015). As will be discussed further below, these amendments are similar 
to those enacted in New South Wales, Australia in 2014, particularly with the new requirement of an 
indictable offence punishable by five years in prison. The five-year indictable offence rule in the New 
South Wales reforms was cited with approval by government Members of Parliament in the Canadian 
debates. See, e.g., House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 187 (23 March 2015) at 1705 
(Hon D Ablonczy). However, the Australian reforms go further than the Canadian ones. See below, the 
text accompanying notes 161-165.
122. Section 265 of the Criminal Code, supra note 10, includes within the definition of assault the 
threatened application of force.
Equality and the Defence of Provocation: 481
Irreconcilable Differences
make the subsequent homicide deserving of our compassion. For example, 
there are property-based offences that are subject to five years or more 
of imprisonment. Should lethal violence ever be mitigating in response 
to provocation that involves only a deprivation of property? We have the 
somewhat bizarre situation that a theft over $5000 could trigger provocation 
whereas a theft under $5000 could not, based on their respective maximum 
punishments. Minister Alexander was comforted by his assumption that 
these cases would not arise.123 But what if, for example, a woman, on 
leaving an abusive spouse, takes some valuable property belonging to 
the accused? Will his defence of provocation be assessed only from the 
perspective of someone who had his property stolen or will it be seen from 
the perspective of a man whose property was stolen by his wife as she left 
him?
How will  the changes to the requisite provoking conduct impact the 
other requirements of the defence? For example, will the ordinary person 
inquiry, which has played such a central role in the defence of provocation, 
be largely subsumed by the assessment of whether the victim committed an 
indictable offence? In other words, once the indictable offence threshold 
has been met, will that make it more likely that the ordinary person standard 
can be satisfied or will these two elements remain distinct?
It is likely that most of the cases arising under this new defence will 
involve situations where self-defence or possibly defence of property 
could also be argued.124 Particularly for triggering offences like sexual 
assault and assault, the new provocation defence in essence becomes a 
defence of failed self-defence, where the excessive use of force may lead 
to a compromise verdict of manslaughter under the guise that the person 
lost self-control after being provoked by the assault. Whether we need 
a compromise verdict of manslaughter where excessive force is used in 
self-defence is a legitimate inquiry but not one that should be addressed 
through a distinct loss-of-control-based defence. Self-defence is based on 
a calculated decision about what kind of force is necessary to protect one’s 
life or bodily integrity, not on out-of-control rage. 
The interaction between self-defence and provocation under the new 
defence is demonstrated by the first appellate decision to address the new 
123. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Evidence, 41st Parl, 
2nd Sess, No 43 (31 March 2015).
124. Roach et al, supra note 48 at 405, suggest that “[T]he most likely—indeed perhaps the only—
offence to qualify under this provision is assault but this raises the question of why accused would rely 
on provocation when he or she in such a case could claim self-defence if they can argue under s. 34 
that they also [were] acting to defend themselves and their acts are reasonable in the circumstances.”
482 The Dalhousie Law Journal
amendments. The Court of Appeal in Rasberry125 appears to apply the 
new amendments to provocation even though the killing took place in 
2013 before s. 232 was amended. Because the Crown was appealing the 
subjective component of the defence, the appellate Court assumed that the 
objective component could be established through the allegation of sexual 
assault. Because the alleged insult in this case was sexual assault, the 
defence would have been available whether or not the amendments were 
in effect and the Crown had in fact conceded the objective component 
of the test. The accused in Rasberry was charged with the murder of a 
neighbour. After a friendly night of drinking with his wife, the victim, and 
another male friend, the accused was ultimately left alone with the victim 
in the Rasberry home while his wife was upstairs in bed. According to the 
accused’s statement to police, the victim suddenly grabbed the accused 
and pushed him backwards over the kitchen counter, threatened to anally 
rape him, and said that if Rasberry didn’t cooperate the victim would go 
upstairs and rape the accused’s wife. The accused then inflicted 23 stab 
wounds and 14 slash wounds on the victim using three kitchen knives. The 
accused called 911 and said there was a man dying on his floor who had 
tried to have anal intercourse with him. Both men were highly intoxicated 
and of roughly the same size although the accused told police the victim 
was much stronger than him. 
The trial judge was explicitly skeptical about Rasberry’s account of the 
events but held that the Crown had failed to disprove provocation beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The Crown challenged the manslaughter verdict on 
appeal, arguing that there was no air of reality to the subjective component 
of provocation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judge’s decision that 
the Crown had failed to disprove the subjective component beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Court also found that there was evidence on which 
the trial judge could conclude that what started out as self-defence evolved 
into provocation when the accused lost his self-control and used excessive 
force. 
Rasberry is an example of provocation being used as a defence of 
excessive force in self-defence. Our concern with the new legislation is 
that the mere allegation of an assault on the part of the victim may be 
sufficient to trigger the defence of provocation. In Rasberry, his statements 
to police and the 911 operator were the only evidence of sexual assault. 
The accused did not testify and there was no physical evidence supporting 
sexual assault. Given that the accused only has to raise a reasonable doubt 
125. Rasberry, supra note 49.
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that an indictable offence was committed by the victim, this amendment 
may not be successful in significantly limiting the defence. 
It is difficult to glean enough detail about the facts from the Court of 
Appeal judgment in Rasberry to give an opinion on the merits of the case, 
although clearly the trial judge was skeptical about Rasberry’s version of 
the events.126 We agree that people who are sexually assaulted have a right 
to defend themselves and whether the force used was proportionate must 
be assessed in the context of any violence the accused was experiencing. 
However, we worry that this will now become the paradigm case of 
provocation and that a mere allegation of assault or sexual assault will 
trigger the availability of the defence.
When one takes such a bright line approach to amending a defence 
as complicated as provocation, it is likely that one will close down some 
problematic aspects of the defence, while at the same time making the 
defence unavailable in cases that might warrant compassion. With respect 
to provocation being used to justify violence against women, superficially 
these changes appear to rule out some of the problematic cases. For 
example, announcing an intent to leave a relationship, or criticizing an 
accused’s sexual prowess do not constitute indictable offences and thus 
would not trigger a defence of provocation. However, where men kill their 
intimate partners, there is often an allegation that she assaulted him by 
scratching his penis,127 throwing  a beer bottle at him,128 coming after him 
with a knife,129 or some other means.130 The burden on the Crown to prove 
that the victim did not assault the accused beyond a reasonable doubt is 
challenging given that the victim is dead. In her study of sentencing for 
intimate femicide, Grant found that provocation was more likely to be 
successful in cases where there had been some, often trivial, act of force 
on the part of the deceased woman.131 In deciding whether provocation 
goes to the jury, a mere assertion that the victim struck the accused may be 
sufficient in these contexts. We also have concerns about the new limits on 
the defence for women who kill abusive spouses. What if the actions of the 
deceased were subtle words suggesting that violence would follow, in the 
context of an abusive relationship? Will those words alone constitute an 
indictable offence subject to more than five years’ imprisonment? Uttering 
126. Ibid at para 22.
127. Angelis, supra note 49.
128. R v Strong (1996), 17 OTC 252.
129. R c Kenol, 2016 QCCA 509 [Kenol].
130. In R v Montgomery, 1997 ABCA 301 the accused had “visible marks of trauma” on his face, 
apparently from an assault by his spouse before he killed her.
131.  See Grant, “Intimate Femicide,” supra note 63 at 810.
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threats is a possibility but heavily veiled threats may not be as apparent to 
an outside observer. The loss of self-control framework says nothing about 
a woman who kills her abusive spouse while he is asleep.132 Is there room 
to look at past conduct, or potential future conduct? Such cases speak more 
to the inadequacy of our understanding of self-defence than to a defence 
of provocation. Despair, fear, and hopelessness may motivate such killings 
but they are rarely premised on a sudden, unforeseen loss of self-control.
The new amendments do nothing to limit the use of provocation in the 
context of same-sex advances. An unwanted “wet kiss” as in Bouchard is 
a sexual assault and thus does not rule out a defence of provocation where 
the accused responds with lethal violence even though it is unlikely such 
a sexual assault would ever have been prosecuted, let alone by indictment. 
If the doctrine of self-defence is not sufficiently flexible to address 
these situations, then our attention should be focused on developing that 
defence, and deciding when excessive force in self-defence warrants a 
compromise manslaughter verdict, rather than treating them as instances 
of provocation based on the assumption that ordinary heterosexual men fly 
into a homicidal rage at the thought of sex with another man.
There are numerous issues around how the defence operates that will 
need clarification. It is the role of the judge to decide whether there is an 
air of reality on every element of the defence of provocation justifying 
putting it to the jury. What will be required to create an air of reality that 
a completed or attempted sexual assault has been committed? Will mens 
rea be addressed? What if the victim of the provoked killing honestly 
believed that the accused was consenting to his sexual advances? Will the 
Crown be tasked with proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim 
took reasonable steps to inquire into consent?133 Or will a mere assertion 
by the defence always be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that an 
offence was committed by the victim? These amendments lack the nuance 
and care that has gone into reforming provocation in other common law 
jurisdictions which provide alternatives that should have at least been 
considered before amending the defence. It is to these jurisdictions that 
we now turn.
132. See R v Whynot (1994), 147 NSR (2d) 111 (CA); Lavallee, supra note 59.
133. Canadian Bar Association, “Submission: Bill S-7: Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural 
Practices Act” (April 2015) 1 at 13-14 (concluding that “In our view, each option for conducting 
the “air of reality” assessment is fraught with complexity and would add significant time to criminal 
trials”).
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III. Options for reform
1. Lessons from other jurisdictions
England, Australia, and New Zealand have undertaken significant revisions 
of the provocation defence over the past decade, largely in response to 
concerns about men raising the defence after killing their intimate partners 
and the limits on the defence for battered women who kill their abusers. 
Any examination of potential reform options from other jurisdictions must 
take into account the differing sentencing regimes for the crime of murder. 
Abolition of provocation has a different meaning in a jurisdiction where 
mandatory sentences prevent meaningful consideration of mitigating 
circumstances in sentencing. In response largely to feminist criticism, three 
Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand134 have abolished provocation. 
None of these jurisdictions currently has mandatory minimum sentences 
for murder. For example, in Tasmania, the first Australian jurisdiction 
to abolish provocation in 2003,135 mandatory minimums for murder had 
already been abolished in 1995.136 This context was explicitly relied on to 
justify abolishing the defence of provocation.
In 2005, Victoria, a jurisdiction with no mandatory minimum sentence 
for murder, became the second jurisdiction in Australia to abolish 
provocation.137 This change was made in response to recommendations 
made in a Victorian Law Reform Commission Report which were critical 
of the gender bias inherent in the defence.138 According to the Report, the 
defence was not only used to justify male violence against women, but the 
requirement of a sudden triggering event  had made it difficult for women 
to successfully use it.139 The Report also found that the defence promoted 
a culture of victim blaming, and that the legal test was conceptually 
difficult to apply.140 The Law Commission recommended that “factors that 
decrease a person’s culpability for an intentional killing should be taken 
into account at sentencing rather than form the basis of a separate partial 
defence.”141
134. Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Act 2009 (NZ), 2009/64.
135. Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act 2003 (Tas).
136. Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), s 158.
137. Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic), s 3.
138. Victorian Law Reform Commission, “Defences to Homicide: Final Report” (Melbourne: 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2004) at 27-31.
139. Ibid at 27. The authors of the Report noted that in their review of the case law that was current 
at the time of the Report’s publication, only three women raised provocation at trial and none of them 
were successful (at 28-29).
140. Ibid at 32-33, 35-36.
141. Ibid at 55.
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The Victorian Parliament’s repeal of provocation was part of a 
package of reforms. In addition to repealing provocation, the legislature 
established the offence of “defensive homicide,” clarified the requirements 
for self-defence, and broadened the scope of admissibility for evidence 
of abuse in relationships. The new offence of defensive homicide was 
intended to be, “a safety net for those who kill in response to family 
violence but who do not meet the test for self-defence because their belief 
in the necessity to defend themselves did not have reasonable grounds.”142 
The offence had the same maximum penalty as manslaughter. Defensive 
homicide was the subject of much criticism on two grounds. First, it had 
been suggested that this offence could have a problematic net-widening 
effect, resulting in manslaughter convictions for women who kill abusive 
partners, rather than acquittals on the basis of self-defence.143 Second, 
the defence was criticized for allowing evidence of provocation for men 
who kill their female intimate partners, thereby reviving provocation 
through the back door.144 Tyson, for example, points to a 2010 decision, 
R. v. Middendorp,145 in which a man with a history of domestic violence 
was convicted of defensive homicide, and not murder, after stabbing his 
spouse four times in the back. This case sparked public outrage146 and 
triggered the Department of Justice to initiate a review of how the offence 
was being applied, especially in the context of gendered and domestic 
violence. However, the consensus among feminists appeared to be that the 
offence should be retained, largely out of concern that self-defence alone 
might not be adequate to deal with cases in which women kill abusive 
partners.147 Despite these concerns, the Victorian Parliament repealed 
defensive homicide in September 2014 but also strengthened the protection 
for battered women under the law of self-defence by making self-defence 
available to an accused “in the context of family violence” even where the 
harm threatened is not immediate and where the force used is in excess 
142. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 9AD, as created by Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic), s 6 and repealed 
by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), s 3(3); Sheehy, Stubbs & 
Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide,” supra note 55 at 478.
143. Tyson, “Victoria’s New Homicide Laws,” supra note 55 at 211.
144. Ibid at 212-214; Tyson, Sex, Culpability and Provocation, supra note 75 at 122-124.
145. R v Middendorp, [2010] VSC 202.
146. Tyson, Sex, Culpability and Provocation, supra note 75 at 122-123.
147. See, e.g., Danielle Tyson, Sarah Capper & Debbie Kirkwood, Submissions for the Review of the 
offence of defensive homicide (2010), Dept of Justice, Victoria (AUS), 13 September 2011.
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of the harm threatened or actually inflicted.148 Finally, Victoria reformed 
its evidence laws to ensure that evidence about family violence would 
be admitted in homicide proceedings to explain the context in which the 
person killed as well as the social, psychological and economic factors that 
can affect family violence victims.149 Victoria is seen to have gone further 
to protect women both as accused persons and as victims than any other 
jurisdiction and could, we believe, provide a model on which Canadian 
law could be based.150 
In Western Australia, mandatory minimums for murder were abolished 
along with the defence of provocation in 2008.151 This change was part of 
a package of reforms that were the result of a Law Reform Commission 
Report152 which noted the problematic nature of “male honour” as a source 
of mitigation and the complexity of the defence.153
Several other Australian jurisdictions have limited the scope of the 
defence. In Queensland, for example, where the legislature was not 
prepared to abolish mandatory minimums, significant changes were 
made to the defence of provocation. Queensland has gone the furthest 
to deal with spousal homicides, limiting the application of the defence 
in the context of domestic relationships where the provocative act was 
done to leave the relationship, to change the nature of the relationship, or 
to indicate that the relationship should change.154 These limits also apply 
where the victim has already ended the relationship.155 Queensland has 
also put the burden of proof on the accused to prove provocation156 and has 
explicitly provided that words alone will not constitute provocation “other 
than in circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character.”157 
148. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 322M; Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 
2014. To be successfully pled, the accused must prove “a subjective belief that the actions taken in 
self-defence were necessary, and that belief must have been based on reasonable grounds…even if 
the accused person is responding to a harm that is not immediate, or his or her response involves the 
use of force in excess of the force involved in the harm or threatened harm.” Tyson, “Victoria’s New 
Homicide Laws” supra note 55 at 210 (citations omitted); see also Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 9AD, as 
created by Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic), s 6 and repealed by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of 
Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), s 3(3).
149. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 9AH(3)(a)–(f), as created by Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic), s 6 
and repealed by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), s 3(3).
150. Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide,” supra note 55 at 483.
151. Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 (WA).
152. Austl, Western Australia, Law Reform Commission, A review of the law of homicide (Perth: 
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, 2007), online: Law Reform Commission of Western 
Australia <http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/P/project_97.aspx>.
153. Ibid at 202-216.
154. Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 304(3).
155. Ibid, s 304(6).
156. Ibid, s 304(9).
157. Ibid, s 304(2).
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Queensland also enacted a partial defence of “killing for preservation in an 
abusive domestic relationship.”158 This provision reduces to manslaughter 
killings where the deceased had a history of domestic violence against 
the accused and the accused believed that killing was necessary to protect 
herself.159 Most recently, the Queensland Parliament passed a Bill aiming 
to abolish the “homosexual panic” aspect of the partial defence which, 
once in force, will amend its Criminal Code to specifically exclude an 
“unwanted sexual advance” except in cases of “exceptional character.”160
Canada’s amendments to provocation appear to be modelled on those 
enacted in 2014 in New South Wales, creating a new defence of extreme 
provocation that retained a loss-of-control standard and an ordinary person 
test.161 Section 23 of the Crimes Act 1900 provides that the conduct of 
the victim must be directed at the accused and must constitute a serious 
indictable offence.162 These reforms were largely motivated by concerns 
158. Ibid, s 304B, introduced by Criminal Code (Abusive Domestic Relationship Defence and Another 
Matter) Amendment Act 2010 (Qld), s 3. This was the result of recommendations made in the report: 
Austl, Queensland, Homicide in Abusive Relationships: A Report on Defences (Report prepared for 
the Attorney-General and Minister for Industrial Relations) by Geraldine Mackenzie & Eric Colvin 
(Brisbane: 2009).
159. The provision reads:
(1) A person who unlawfully kills another (the deceased) under circumstances that, but for the 
provisions of this section, would constitute murder, is guilty of manslaughter only, if—
(a) the deceased has committed acts of serious domestic violence against the person in the 
course of an abusive domestic relationship; and
(b) the person believes that it is necessary for the person’s preservation from death or 
grievous bodily harm to do the act or make the omission that causes the death; and
(c) the person has reasonable grounds for the belief having regard to the abusive domestic 
relationship and all the circumstances of the case.
(2) An abusive domestic relationship is a domestic relationship existing between 2 persons in 
which there is a history of acts of serious domestic violence committed by either person against 
the other.
(3) A history of acts of serious domestic violence may include acts that appear minor or trivial 
when considered in isolation.
(4) Subsection (1) may apply even if the act or omission causing the death (the response) was 
done or made in response to a particular act of domestic violence committed by the deceased 
that would not, if the history of acts of serious domestic violence were disregarded, warrant the 
response.
(5) Subsection (1)(a) may apply even if the person has sometimes committed acts of domestic 
violence in the relationship.
(6) For subsection (1)(c), without limiting the circumstances to which regard may be had for the 
purposes of the subsection, those circumstances include acts of the deceased that were not acts 
of domestic violence.
160. Plater, Line & Fitz-Gibbon, supra note 1 at 17-18.
161. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23. These amendments followed the release of a report by the Select 
Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation, Austl, New South Wales, Select Committee on the 
Partial Defence of Provocation, The Partial Defence of Provocation (Sydney: Select Committee on the 
Partial Defence of Provocation, 2013).
162. A serious indictable offence is defined in s 4 of the Crimes Act 1990 as one that is punishable by 
imprisonment for at least five years.
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over the use of the defence by men who kill their female intimate partners.163 
Significantly, a number of other reforms to the legislation demonstrate that 
much more thought went into the New South Wales provisions compared 
to their Canadian counterpart. For example, the defence in New South 
Wales is limited to situations in which an ordinary person could have lost 
self-control “to the extent of intending to kill or inflict grievous bodily 
harm on the deceased.” This change directly responds to the critique that 
ordinary people do not respond with fatal violence except to the most 
extreme provoking behaviour. New South Wales is also explicit that 
neither a non-violent sexual advance nor conduct induced by the accused 
to provide an excuse can constitute extreme provocation. Further, s. 23(4) 
provides tht the provoking conduct need not occur immediately before the 
act causing death. Removing the suddenness requirement in this way was 
intended to make the defence more available to those who have suffered 
ongoing abuse at the hands of an intimate partner.164 However, despite 
removal of the suddenness requirement, a step Canada has failed to take, 
Kate Fitz-Gibbon argues that the new extreme provocation defence will 
reduce access to the defence for battered women who kill even though it 
was intended to retain provocation for this group.165
The Australian Capital Territory166 and the Northern Territory167 
have both limited the applicability of provocation for non-violent sexual 
advances. Both provisions state that a non-violent sexual advance towards 
the accused is not in itself sufficient to constitute provocation but may be 
considered along with other conduct of the deceased. 
 England has also taken steps to reform its provocation defence. 
As in Canada, a murder conviction carries a mandatory life sentence. 
In 2010, the defence of provocation was abolished in England and 
Wales and replaced with a new defence based on the loss of control.168 
These reforms disregarded the recommendation of Ministry of Justice 
Consultation Paper which urged removing loss of control as a requirement 
of the defence.169 The new partial defence of loss of control was enacted 
163. Kate Fitz-Gibbon, “Homicide Law Reform in New South Wales: Examining the Merits of the 
Partial Defence of ‘Extreme’ Provocation” (2017) 40 Melbourne UL Rev 769 at 787; The Partial 
Defence of Provocation, supra note 161 at 200.
164. Fitz-Gibbon, ibid at 779, 781.
165. Ibid at 789-791.
166. Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 13(3).
167. Criminal Code 1983 (NT), s 158(5).
168. Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), c 25, ss 54-56. See also Kate Fitz-Gibbon, “Replacing 
Provocation in England and Wales: Examining the Partial Defence of Loss of Control,” (2013) 40:2 
JL & Soc’y 280 [Fitz-Gibbon, “Replacing Provocation”].
169. UK, Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Commission No 304) 
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2006) at 80-84.
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to “better cater for the unique circumstances within which battered women 
kill while also providing a provision that excludes defendants who kill 
an intimate partner in response to alleged sexual infidelity.”170 In many 
respects, the new loss-of-control defence, which is rather complex in its 
elements, resembles the defence of provocation. The accused must have 
a loss of self-control in response to a qualifying trigger where a person of 
the accused’s sex and age, with the normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint, might have acted in a similar way; essentially the same objective 
test as the provocation defence.171 Notably, the loss of self-control need 
not be sudden.172 The critical changes, for the purpose of this paper, relate 
to what is considered a qualifying trigger of the loss of self-control. In 
general, the defence applies where words or conduct cause the accused to 
have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged,173 language we saw 
in Tran. There is an explicit provision that the accused’s fear of serious 
violence from the victim will qualify, opening up the defence to women 
who kill their abusers.174 The fact that something said or done constituted 
sexual infidelity is to be disregarded175 as is any fear of violence or sense 
of being wronged that was incited by the accused to provide an excuse to 
use violence.176
The English reforms are somewhat puzzling in that they were animated 
by a desire to remove the gender bias from the defence and yet, contrary 
to recommendations, loss of control remains the organizing principle. 
The UK government did respond to criticisms about this by removing 
the suddenness requirement for the loss of self-control and by explicitly 
including fear of future violence as a qualifying trigger, two reforms that 
we have not seen in the Canadian context. Nonetheless, concerns have 
been raised that requiring that an accused must lose control could limit the 
defence for women who kill their abusers.177 
2. A new approach for Canada: abolishing provocation and mandatory 
minimums for murder
In our view the approach taken by Victoria should be considered for 
Canada, with the abolition of the mandatory minimum sentence for 
murder being crucial to the reform. Through a package of reforms, Victoria 
170. Fitz-Gibbon, “Replacing Provocation,” supra note 168 at 280.
171. Coroners and Justice Act 2009, supra note 168, s 54(1)(c).
172. Ibid, s 54(2).
173. Ibid, s 55(4).
174. Ibid, s 55(3).
175. Ibid, s 55(6)(c).
176. Ibid, ss 55(6)(a) and (b).
177. Fitz-Gibbon, “Replacing Provocation,” supra note 168 at 290-292.
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abolished provocation but at the same time expanded self-defence so that 
the defence might still be open to a battered woman who uses excessive 
force to defend herself or who kills an abusive spouse while he is asleep. 
We recognize that persuading Parliament to abolish mandatory minimum 
sentences for murder would be no easy task. If abolition is not possible 
in Canada, we recommend that, at a minimum, reforms along the line of 
those adopted in Queensland be pursued. Those reforms explicitly address 
problems around men killing their female intimate partners and limit 
“homosexual panic” scenarios.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to set the precise details of an 
appropriate sentencing scheme for murder and other homicide offences, a 
complex task that requires its own paper. The current regime raises grave 
concerns about fairness and about the extent to which potentially innocent 
accused are under enormous pressure to plead guilty to manslaughter to 
avoid these rigid sentences.178 Canada has an extremely harsh sentencing 
regime for murder with a mandatory life sentence attached to all murders 
and periods of parole eligibility from 10–25 years for second degree 
murder179 and 25 years for first degree murder.180 The Harper government 
took steps to make this regime even harsher and more inflexible. For 
example, it abolished the s. 745 procedure (the so-called “faint hope 
clause”) which provided an opportunity for people convicted of murder 
to apply for review of parole ineligibility periods greater than 15 years. 
Parliament also enacted legislation that allows for parole ineligibility 
periods to be made consecutive to one another, resulting in de facto life 
without parole sentences.181 The constitutionality of these new, much longer 
parole ineligibility periods has not yet been considered by the Supreme 
Court. Given the s. 12 Charter jurisprudence prohibiting “cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment,”182 developments in the research about 
178. Debra Parkes & Emma Cunliffe, “Women and wrongful convictions: Concepts and challenges” 
(2015) 11:3 Intl J L in Context 219; Elizabeth Sheehy, “Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences” (2001) 39:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 529 [Sheehy, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences”].
179. Criminal Code, supra note 10, s 745(c).
180. Ibid, s 745(a).
181. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and another Act, SC 2011, c 2. The faint hope clause has 
been abolished for all murders which are committed after 2 December 2011. See, e.g., Criminal Code, 
s 745.21(1)–745.51 and Canada, Bill C-53, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Corrections 
and Conditional Release Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts, 2nd 
Sess, 41st Parl 2015. For examples of cases of 75-year parole ineligibility, see R v Bourque, 2014 
NBQB 237, [2014] NBJ No 295 (QL); R v Ostamas, 2016 MBQB 136, [2016] MJ No 197 (QL), 329 
Man R (2d) 203; R v Saretzky, 2017 ABQB 496, [2017] AJ No 831 (QL).
182. See, e.g., R v Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 SCR 773; R v Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13, [2016] 1 SCR 130.
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the impact of long-term imprisonment,183 and  increasing international 
attention to the human rights implications of life sentences,184 there is good 
reason to believe they may be unconstitutional.
Don Stuart has argued that Canada’s murder sentencing regime might 
be unconstitutional in the absence of a provocation defence.185 In our 
view, the constitutionality of mandatory sentences for murder does not 
hinge on the availability of provocation as a defence, but rather on the 
lack of a principled mitigation regime to account for the wide range of 
circumstances in which intentional killings occur.
We recognize that the abolition of provocation could result in women 
who kill their abusive partners losing access to the partial defence where 
self-defence fails. Sheehy and her colleagues in Australia and New 
Zealand examined how often women raised self-defence and provocation 
in their comparative study of defences to homicide for battered women.186 
The study found that, in Canada, of the 16 women who went to trial for 
killing their abusive spouses between 2000 and 2010, 11 were acquitted 
on the grounds of self-defence, a much higher rate than in Australia or 
New Zealand. Nineteen additional women pleaded guilty to manslaughter, 
although it is unclear how many of these 19 were based on the Crown 
assuming that a defence of provocation had a reasonable possibility of 
success.187 Because of the high number of guilty pleas, it is difficult to assess 
the role of provocation in these cases. However, it does seem reasonable to 
posit that while provocation may play less of a role in Canada for battered 
women, because of the more contextual approach taken to self-defence,188 
provocation was probably the basis for some manslaughter verdicts.189 We 
believe that abolishing mandatory minimums for murder would provide 
more flexibility for these women than the current gendered defence which 
favours sudden losses of self-control and has historically not served women 
183. See, e.g., Serena Wright, Ben Crewe & Susie Hulley, “Suppression, denial, sublimation: 
Defending against the initial pains of very long life sentences” (2017) 21:2 Theoretical Criminology 
225; Alison Liebling & Shadd Maruna, eds, The Effects of Imprisonment (Cullompton: Willan, 2005).
184. Dirk Van Zyl Smit & Catherine Appleton, eds, Life Imprisonment and Human Rights (Oxford: 
Hart-Bloomsbury, 2016). 
185. Stuart, Coughlan & Delisle, supra note 26. See also Roach et al, supra note 48 at 406 who argue 
that arbitrary restrictions on the provocation defence, such as those brought in by the new amendments, 
are “ripe  for Charter challenge.”
186. Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide,” supra note 55. See also Sheehy, Defending 
Battered Women, supra note 11.
187. Ibid. The study (at 486) found one woman who did not proceed to trial, three who proceeded to 
trial and were convicted of manslaughter and one who was convicted of murder. Of the 20 guilty pleas 
19 were to manslaughter and one was to murder. 
188. Lavallee, supra note 59.
189. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 92.
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well. We are not the first to argue that provocation should be abolished 
along with the harsh mandatory minimum sentences for murder. The 
Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, for example, supports 
the abolition of provocation but only if mandatory minimums for murder 
are also abolished.190
We are not arguing that men should be sentenced to more harsh 
sentences for murder nor that provoking acts of the victim will never be 
relevant to sentencing; but rather that the mitigation regime be redistributed 
so that out-of-control rage is not the sole basis for mitigation. By widening 
the range of factors that can be considered in mitigation, it is likely that 
more accused will benefit from increased flexibility in sentencing. This 
approach would also open up the possibility of seriously considering 
R. v. Gladue191 factors in sentencing for murder, rather than limiting the 
applicability of section 718.2(e) of the Code to a very cursory analysis of 
the appropriate period of parole ineligibility for second degree murder.192 
We recognize that a regime that provides for mitigation in the 
sentencing of murder shifts decision-making power from the jury to the 
judge to determine what types of mitigation will be recognized. This in 
turn raises the possibility of discriminatory narratives about violence 
against women or other vulnerable groups driving sentencing decisions. 
Hunter and Tyson, for example, have cautioned that the stereotypes and 
victim blaming that animated provocation could well shift into sentencing 
decisions given “the tendency for sentencing in cases of domestic homicide 
to undermine legal reforms designed to benefit women.”193 However, in 
their study examining the impact on sentencing for intimate partner killings 
in Victoria after the abolition of provocation they found “a mixed picture 
in relation to concerns about the reintroduction of problematic, gendered 
provocation narratives at the sentencing stage.”194 In general, they found 
such narratives had a minimal impact on sentencing outcomes in domestic 
homicide cases. Overall, courts were able to distinguish cases where the 
defendant had “a justifiable sense of being wronged” from those where the 
alleged mitigation was based on male control over their female partners.195 
However, at the level of discourse, problematic provocation narratives 
190. The Response of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies to Reforming Criminal 
Code Defences: Provocation, Self-Defence and Defence of Property, supra note 1, recommendation 
38.
191. R v Gladue, 1999 CanLii 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688.
192. See, e.g., R v Paul, 2014 BCCA 81. 
193. “The Implementation of Feminist Law Reforms,” supra note 17 at 132.
194. Ibid at 152.
195. Ibid.
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were evident and defence counsel continued to raise such narratives in 
sentencing submissions. At the same time, they also saw the emergence 
of new discourses denouncing male violence against women, particularly 
from women judges. 
Conclusion
We have seen some improvements in the way courts have infused meaning 
into the defence of provocation over the past decade. Judges are beginning 
to reject cases where a woman leaves her spouse,196 threatens to have an 
abortion,197 or challenges his sexual prowess.198 Judges are also beginning 
to recognize that a non-violent same-sex advance should not cause 
someone to lose their self-control and kill.199 However, these positions are 
not uniformly applied and, as Rasberry reveals, are always a matter of 
interpretation.
By prioritizing rage over other extreme emotions like fear and despair, 
the defence of provocation has historically been more applicable to male 
rage than to the realities of women who kill. Jurisprudence under the 
previous provocation provision demonstrated three problematic themes: 
it permitted the excuse of homicidal rage against intimate partners based 
on discriminatory assumptions about what is an “ordinary” response to a 
woman leaving, or threatening to leave, a relationship, and it permitted 
men to argue that lethal violence in response to an advance from 
another man was “ordinary.” By contrast, abused women who kill their 
abusers have had limited access to the defence. While the amendment to 
subsection 232(2) narrows the qualifying triggers to more serious conduct 
by the victim, and may preclude the defence where the only provocation 
is a woman leaving a relationship, it does nothing to limit the defence 
where there is an allegation by the accused that the victim assaulted him 
or made a same-sex advance triggering the loss of self-control. We doubt 
that the defence of provocation as it exists can be applied in a manner 
that is consistent with substantive equality. The Australian experience, 
particularly that in Victoria, demonstrates that reform of provocation is 
best done in a comprehensive context that looks at all aspects of the crime 
of murder, keeping the sentencing regime front and centre in developing 
defences and substantive doctrine. This is not how law reform relating to 
homicide has proceeded in Canada in recent years. Instead, sentencing 
provisions have been added on a piecemeal basis in response to public 
196. Kenol, supra note 129.
197. R v Barrett, 2016 ONCA 12.
198. R c Godbout, 2015 QCCS 6265.
199. R v Brewer, 2016 BCSC 1291.
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outcry over particular cases and have consistently ratcheted sentences up, 
while individual defences are amended without consideration of other 
defences. The defence of provocation will, in our view, remain both over- 
and under-inclusive due to the problematic foundation on which it rests. 
We thus urge the government to undertake a re-examination of the defence 
of provocation (and potentially self-defence) and the sentencing regime 
for murder to consider in a more principled way what kinds of killings are 
deserving of our compassion.
